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I. INTRODUCTION
On May 22, 2000, the Supreme Court narrowly affirmed a decision of
the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, holding that
section 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 violates the First
Amendment.' Under section 505, cable television providers offering
channels "primarily dedicated to sexually-oriented programming" were
required to either "'fully scramble or otherwise fully block' those channels
or to limit their transmission to hours when children are unlikely to be
viewing, set by administrative regulation as the time between 10 p.m. and 6
a.m. ' 2 Because scrambling technology can be imprecise and allow portions
of some programs, though scrambled, to nevertheless be seen or heard
through a "phenomenon known as 'signal bleed'," most "cable operators
adopted the... 'time channeling' approach" as their method of compliance
with the statute.3 The decision to engage in time channeling effectively
eliminated the transmission of the targeted programming to every
household in those service areas for two-thirds of the day.4 Furthermore,

cable providers were already required by section 504 of the same Act to
"without charge, fully scramble or otherwise fully block" the reception of
any channel to a particular customer's house upon request by the
customer.5 Playboy Entertainment Group brought suit and successfully
argued that section 505 was "unnecessarily
restrictive content-based
6
legislation violative of the First Amendment.,
The ramifications of United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group

remain to be seen. Should interested parties view the decision as evidence
of the Court ushering in a more conducive era for sexually-oriented cable
programming? Has the Court quietly issued a landmark case in First
Amendment telecommunications regulation? Perhaps the Playboy decision
will become "the case" for cable television regulation in the incipient years
of the Third Millennium; on the other hand, it may simply be an example of
the Court disposing of an unconstitutional statute without departing from
existing law. What are the consequences of invalidating a statute designed
to protect children from harmful influences when the statute imposes a
financial burden upon speech, but stops short of a ban? Is "signal bleed" a
1. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
2. Id. at 806 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 561(a) (Supp. V 1999)).
3. Id.

4. Id.
5. 47 U.S.C. § 560(a) (Supp. V 1999).
6. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 807.
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legitimate hazard to children, or merely a politicized issue bearing the
mantle for a wealth of unspoken indecency concerns? Most importantly,
what should interested parties take away from this decision?
This Note argues that the most important aspect of Playboy is the
Court's determination that cable television is not analogous to broadcast
media. Provided it withstands the test of time, this distinction allows the
cable industry to avoid the more stringent regime placed upon broadcast
media. The Playboy decision also shows the Court's willingness to
invalidate laws even when they serve a compelling interest and impose less
restrictions than a complete ban. Members of the Court differed on whether
"signal bleed" actually constituted an influence harmful to children. This
discrepancy evinces a significant disagreement on where lines should be
drawn discerning dangerous from harmless material. It also demonstrates
the extent to which the "least restrictive alternative" test can be bent to
serve competing interests.
Part II of this Note provides a general explanation and analysis of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, examining the competing goals and
interests leading to and served by the Act. Part HI delineates the substantive
effects of sections 504 and 505, both intended and unforeseen. Part IV
discusses Playboy in depth, including an analysis of the majority's and the
dissent's perspectives, a look at past applications of the "least restrictive
alternative" test, and an inquiry into the existence and degree of significant
consequences of the case. This Note concludes in Part V by restating the
major impacts of the case and making limited recommendations for
interested parties.

II. THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996
Simply put, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the 1996 Act) is
the latest of several enactments designed to stimulate competition in the
telecommunications industry.7 Though the Act's ultimate consequences
may be unsettled and its degree of approval varied, it has thus far achieved
relatively greater success than its predecessors.8 Congress's express goal in
passing the 1996 Act was to deregulate the telecommunications industry so
as to reduce entry barriers and promote competition, 9 and evidence suggests
7. The 1996 Act was preceded by such bills as the Communications Act of 1934, the
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, and the Cable Television Consumer Protection
and Competition Act of 1992. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Economic and Political
Consequences of the 1996 TelecommunicationsAct, REGULATION, Jan. 1, 2000, at 36-37.
8. See id. at 36 ("Improvements in competitiveness are modest by some standards but
impressive when judged against the results of other legislation with the announced goal of
increasing market rivalry (e.g., the 1984 and 1992 Cable Acts).").
9. See id. at 37.
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that, at least to some degree, the Act has in fact accomplished this goal.'I It
would be naYve, however, to assume that competition and consumer gains
were the only factors influencing the terms of the Act.
Lobbyist contributions may have played a large role in shaping the
1996 Act. In examining the Act, Professor Thomas Hazlett observed that
federal policymakers had benefited through increased political
contributions from telecommunications firms and executives." He added
that the Act provided a platform for particularly newsworthy social issues,
including TV violence, the V-Chip, and Internet indecency, 2 implying that
industry players may not have been the only interested lobbyists. Many
consumer activists view the Act as a failure and cite contributions by
corporate Political Action Committees ("PACs") as the source of the
perceived failure.13 Figures compiled by the Center for Responsive Politics
reveal that "[i]n the 1996 and 1998 election cycles, federal political
contributions by telecommunications firms rose absolutely and relative to
,,14
the overall rise in political giving ....
That telecommunications regulation now accounts for a larger
percentage of political contributions is not necessarily a negative. It does,
however, relate back to the subject of adult entertainment on cable
television because "'hot button' social issues" 15 were addressed by
powerful lobby groups. One can infer that certain provisions in the 1996
Act, perhaps including section 505, were included for the sake of votes and
future contributions, rather than for increasing competition and aiding
consumers.

III. SECTIONs 504 AND 505
Both sections 504 and 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
relate to the blocking or scrambling of cable channels, but they operate in
significantly different ways. Section 504 favors parents and other private
individuals as decision makers regarding the cable programming entering
their homes; section 505 places this role in the hands of legislators.

10. See id. at 38.

11. Id. at 44-45. Thomas Hazlett is a Professor in the Department of Agricultural and
Resource Economics and Director of the Program on Telecommunications Policy at the
University of California, Davis. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, Rent Seeking,
and the FirstAmendment, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 905, 905 (1997).
12. Hazlett, supra note 7, at 45.
13. Id. at 36 ("The activist denounces the Telecommunications Act 'as an abysmal
failure that has led to consolidation, not competition, and higher prices, not consumer cost
savings."').

14. Id. at 44-45.
15. Id. at 45.
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Whether the sections compliment or corrupt one another is the major
source of debate.
A.

Section 504's Effects, or Lack Thereof

Though a chief purpose of section 504 is to enable cable customers to
keep sexually explicit material out of their homes, the provision does not
explicitly state it. 6 Section 504 provides that "[u]pon request by a cable
service subscriber, a cable operator shall, without charge, fully scramble or
otherwise fully block the audio and video programming of each channel
carrying such programming so that one not a subscriber does not receive
it.' 7 Thus, a person disapproving of a channel's programming for any
reason could keep it from being transmitted into his or her household.
Blocking under section 504, however, was used sparsely, even during the
period of more than a year when it was the only blocking mechanism.'
This notion is quantified by the fact that "[b]etween March 1996 and May
1997, while the Government was enjoined from enforcing § 505 ... . fewer
than 0.5% of cable subscribers requested full blocking [under section
504]... ,,19
B.

Section 505's Background

Unlike section 504, section 505 is explicitly aimed at sexuallyoriented programming. Section 505's requirement reads as follows:
In providing sexually explicit adult programming or other
programming that is indecent on any channel of its service primarily
dedicated to sexually-oriented programming, a multichannel video
programming distributor shall fully scramble or otherwise fully block
the video and audio portion of such channel so that one
2 not a
subscriber to such channel or programming does not receive it. 0
The statute requires that channels be "fully" blocked or scrambled
because current scrambling technology, used to keep customers from
receiving channels for which they have not paid, often fails to do so. Cable
television systems typically use radio frequency or "baseband" scrambling
systems, "which may not prevent signal bleed.... [meaning] discernible
16. Section 504 was included in a portion of the 1996 Act entitled "Title V-Obscenity
and Violence." See H.R. CoNF.REP. No. 104-458, at 81-86 (1996). Sections 501-509 are
included under "Subtitle A-Obscene, Harassing, and Wrongful Utilization of
Telecommunications Facilities" and sections 501-503, and 505 specifically mention obscene
or explicit programming. One can reasonably infer that section 504 was included with the
same context in mind. See id.
17. 47 U.S.C. § 560(a) (Supp. V 1999).
18. See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 816 (2000).

19. Id.
20. 47 U.S.C. § 561(a) (Supp. V 1999) (emphasis added).
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pictures may appear from time to time on the scrambled screen," and audio
portions may be heard.2' Though suitable alternatives exist that would
eliminate
signal bleed, they currently are not economical for system-wide
22
use. Perhaps anticipating that cable providers would be unable to
scramble the programming fully, the drafters included an "implementation"
clause in section 505, stating that until cable providers complied with the
requirements, they were restricted from broadcasting such programming
during "the hours of the day (as determined by the Commission) when a
significant number of children are likely to view it." 23 The hours of the day
when children are unlikely to be watching, as determined by the
Commission, are from 10 P.M. to 6 A.M.24 Due to the previously mentioned
financial burden associated with fully scrambling, most cable providers
used the "time channeling" approach, only broadcasting such channels
between 10 P.M. and 6 A.M. 25 According to one survey, 69% complied with
section 505 in this fashion. 26 Therefore, in over two-thirds of the cablereceiving United States, even paying customers desiring to view the
explicit programming could not do so between the hours of 6 A.M. and 10
P.M. This constituted a considerable restriction, since it is estimated that
"30 to
50% of all adult programming is viewed by households prior to 10
,,27
p.m.
C.

Section 505's Casualtiesand Beneficiaries

Section 505 had severe effects on many parties. Cable providers were
left with the options of implementing economically burdensome
scrambling systems, or offering sexually-oriented programming for only
one-third of the day, either way decreasing the profitability of offering such
stations. In turn, entertainment companies producing explicit programming
found their product less profitable, eventually prompting the suit by
Playboy Entertainment Group.2' Adult consumers willing to pay for
sexually-oriented programming were generally able to do so for only eight
hours a day. Parents fearing that their children would be exposed to
21. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 807.
22. See id. at 808. Digital systems, predicted to become the systems of choice in the
near future, would eliminate the problem of signal bleed. Id. This possibility is discussed at
greater length infra.
23. 47 U.S.C. § 561(b).
24. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 806.
25. Id. at 806-07.
26. Id. at 809.
27. Id (citing Playboy Entm't Group, Inc. v. United States, 30 F. Supp. 2d 702, 711 (D.
Del. 1998), affd, Playboy, 529 U.S. 803).
28. Id.
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inappropriate images through signal bleed experienced no legitimate net
gain, as they could have had the programming completely blocked from
their televisions by placing a phone call under section 504.29
One must wonder who actually benefited from section 505.
Supporters would be expected to point to the child as the chief beneficiary.
Considering the child a beneficiary of section 505 assumes that exposing
children to sexually-oriented programming does in fact have a negative
effect. While this belief may be widely held, it is not indisputable. Some
parents might intentionally expose their children to explicit material to
educate them or to de-mystify situations which the children will inevitably
be exposed to at some point. Additionally, young children typically are
supervised sufficiently enough to keep them from viewing inappropriate
material. Conversely, any children not kept under regular supervision are
often those whose parents have in some way determined to be old or
mature enough to handle some responsibilities, including televisionviewing choices. These children are the ones most likely "protected" by
section 505. The dangers of exposing such older children to fleeting images
of explicit material seem considerably less severe than those of exposing
less mature children to the same material.
Despite the more stringent provisions contained in section 505, the
fact remains that children would be as well served by section 504, thereby
giving a minimal amount of deference to parents in raising their own
young. Children of parents who subscribe to channels such as Playboy
would not benefit from the addition of section 505, as it only applies to
nonsubscribers. Children of parents who contact their cable company to
have such channels fully blocked would not benefit from the addition of
section 505 because the channels will already have been completely
blocked from their homes twenty-four hours a day. Children of parents who
take an active role in determining what their children view would not
benefit from section 505 because the parents themselves would act as
human blocking devices. The only children who stand to gain a substantial
benefit are those whose parents would prefer to shield them from explicit
material, but who fail to ensure this result. Considering that the latter
example suggests a lack of any supervision, one might imagine that the
potential to view intermittent images of sexual behavior would be among
the most benign influences on such children's development. For example,
such children would lack both the appropriate encouragement for education
and other valuable activities, and also the appropriate discouragement of
such adolescent influences as drugs and gang involvement. Any benefit

29. 47 U.S.C. § 560(a).
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derived under section 505 in "protecting" a subclass of children from the
supposedly deleterious effects of scrambled blips of sexual material is
marginal at best.
Section 505, however, is not without beneficiaries. In the apparent
"unmitigated political success" of the 1996 Act,30 one can infer that many
pieces of legislation, especially those seemingly unnecessary and
unconstitutional due to similar less restrictive sections in the same
enactment, are the product of political compromises related to soft money
and PAC contributions. Thus, the policymakers responsible for section 505,
and in fact the whole 1996 Act, may have enjoyed very substantial benefits
as a consequence of the section's enactment.
The above is not intended to imply that section 505, or indeed any
other section, was included under anything less than legitimate
circumstances. It is not the goal of this Note to cast doubt on the American
political system or any actor within it. It is, however, a goal of this Note to
determine the reasoning behind section 505's enactment as well as the
significance of its invalidation. Given the fact that the 1996 Act made
television content a key political issue,3' this analysis would be remiss if it
failed to address the possibility that section 505 constituted a political
reward. The lawmakers responsible for section 505 will be making future
telecommunications law, and a legislative readiness to make questionable
law in return for contributions or votes is significant to the future of
telecommunications law.

IV. THE CASE
Regardless of ex post facto concerns about the wisdom or
methodology behind section 505's inclusion in the 1996 Act, it was
included, and subsequently invalidated. However, was the section correctly
invalidated? The case was decided 5-4, with the majority and dissent
strongly opposing one another on several key issues. One must examine
both sides to fully comprehend the ramifications of the case.
A.

The Majority'sPerspective

Writing for the majority in Playboy, Justice Stevens begins by
stressing "[t]wo essential points" which the majority believes "should be
30. Hazlett, supra note 7, at 45, stating that "[iln both categories (soft money and PAC
donations) in both [the 1996 and 1998 election] cycles, telecommunications spending
increased. Such success could be achieved by random chance only 6 times out of 100." Id.
31. Id. ("[The Telecommunications Act has provided a platform for an exceptionally
newsworthy set of public issues, [including] ... 'hot button' social issues like TV violence,
the V-chip, and Internet indecency.").
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understood concerning the speech at issue ...
2,32 He stated that: (1) the
Court "assume[s] that many adults themselves would find the material
highly offensive; and... consider[ing] the further circumstance that the
material comes unwanted into homes where children might see or hear it
against parental wishes or consent, there are legitimate reasons for
regulating it;'' 33 and (2) "all parties bring the case... on the premise that
Playboy's programming has First Amendment protection. '34 He added that
"the Government disclaim[ed] any interest in preventing children from
seeing or hearing [the material]" with their parents' consent.35
Early in the opinion, Justice Stevens recites the "general rule... that
the right of expression prevails" over "shield[ing] the sensibilities of
listeners. 36 Generally, "[w]e are expected to protect our own sensibilities
'simply by averting [our] eyes."'' 37 The majority also points out, however,
that "[c]able television, like broadcast media, presents unique problems...
which may justify restrictions that would be unacceptable in other
contexts., 38 For example, in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, the Court held
that the FCC did not violate the First Amendment when proscribing the
broadcast of indecent material.39 The Court based its holding in Pacifica on
two main arguments: (1) "the broadcast media have established a uniquely
pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans" because "offensive,
indecent material... confronts the citizen, not only in public, but also in
the privacy of the home, where the individual's right to be left alone plainly
outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder;" 40 and (2)
"broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to
read. [Though a] written [indecent] message might have been
incomprehensible to a first grader... [a] broadcast could... enlarge[ a
child's vocabulary in an instant."4'
One could argue that just as one instant of exposure to language can
enlarge a child's vocabulary, one instant of exposure to explicit behavior
can enlarge a child's awareness of sexuality, perhaps at an age where such
knowledge will likely do more harm than good. Justice Stevens explains,
32. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 811.
33. Id.
34. Id. The First Amendment protection is based on the fact that the material was "not
alleged to be obscene," thus "adults ha[d] a constitutional right to view [the material]." Id.

35. Id.
36. Id. at 813.
37. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,21 (1971)).
38. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813.

39. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,748 (1978).
40. Id. See also Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
41. Pacifica,438 U.S. at 749.
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however, that despite the similarities between broadcast media and cable
television, there is also a "key difference.., on which [the Playboy] case
tus.'' 42 He continues:
Cable systems have the capacity to block unwanted channels on a
household-by-household basis. The option to block reduces the
likelihood... that traditional First Amendment scrutiny would deprive
the Government of all authority to address this sort of problem. The
corollary... is that targeted blocking enables the Government to
support parental authority without affecting the First Amendment
interests of speakers and willing listeners-listeners for whom, if the
speech is unpopular or indecent,
43 the privacy of their own homes may
be the optimal place of receipt.
This point may well be the most important element to glean from
Playboy. Had the Court viewed cable television as substantively no
different from broadcast media, the case would have fallen under the
Pacifica precedent, and the Government would almost surely have
prevailed. In fact, in the Playboy dissent, Justice Breyer writes that "[ilt is
difficult to reconcile... [the Playboy] decision with... [the Court's]
foundational cases that have upheld similar laws, such as FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation."" This statement suggests disagreement with the majority's
broadcast media/cable television distinction, though the dissent never
explicitly says such.45
Section 505 was undisputedly a content-based restriction, as it
"applie[d] only to channels primarily dedicated to 'sexually explicit adult
programming or other programming that is indecent,"' and was
unconcerned with signal bleed from other channels. 46 Sections such as 505,
which single out particular speech based on content, "can stand only if...
[they] satisf[y] strict scrutiny. ' 47 Content-based speech restrictions "must
be narrowly tailored to promote.., compelling Government interest[s]. '48
The general rule is that "[i]f a less restrictive alternative would49 serve the
Government's purpose, the legislature must use that alternative.A
The District Court found that section 504, given adequate publicity,
would be a less restrictive alternative.50 At the Supreme Court level, "[n]o
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Playboy, 529 U.S. at 815.
Id.
Id. at 847. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 835-47.
Id. at 811.
Id. at 813; see Sable Comm. of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813.
Id. See also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997); Sable Comm., 492 U.S. at

126.
50. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 816.
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one dispute[d] that § 504... [was] narrowly tailored to the Government's
goal of supporting parents who want[ed] ... channels blocked," but
questions remained as to whether section 504 could be effective.5 ' In the
existence of a "plausible, less restrictive alternative.., it is the
Government's
obligation
to prove that the alternative will be ineffective to
• •
,,12
achieve its goals.
That being the case, the Government turned to
"empirical evidence showing that § 504... generated few requests for
household-by-household blocking" to support its position that it was not an
effective alternative. 53 The District Court found support for the
Government's contention sorely lacking, remarking that the Government
only pointed to "two city councilors, eighteen individuals, one United
States Senator, and the officials of one city" who had actually complained
about viewing signal bleed, and that with the exception of one individual,
the cable companies had, in each instance, offered to rectify the situation
for free.54 The Supreme Court acceded, stating that "[i]f the number of
children transfixed by even flickering pornographic television images in
fact reached into the millions... [the Court] would have expected to be
directed to more than a handful of complaints."55 The Court thus agreed
with the District Court that "the Government ha[d] failed to establish a
pervasive, nationwide problem justifying its nationwide daytime speech
ban."5 6
The Supreme Court also agreed with the District Court that there was
no proof that a properly publicized section 504 would be ineffective:
("[The Government's argument that § 504 is ineffective] is premised
on adequate notice to subscribers. It is not clear, however, from the
record that notices of the provisions of § 504 have been adequate").
There is no evidence that a well-promoted voluntary blocking
provision would not be capable at least of informing parents about
signal bleed (if they are not yet aware of it) and about their rights to
have the bleed blocked (if
57 they consider it a problem and have not yet
controlled it themselves).

51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. Later in the same paragraph, Justice Stevens quantifies this contention, noting
that "[a] survey of cable operators determined that fewer than 0.5% of cable subscribers
requested full blocking during that time." Id. (citing Playboy Entm't Group, 30 F. Supp. 2d

at 712).
54. Id. at 820 (quoting Playboy Entm't Group, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 709) (footnote and
record citations omitted).
55. Id. at 822.
56. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 823.
57. Id. (quoting Playboy Entm't Group, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 719).
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The Court added that section 504 will likely serve the Government's
interests better than the time channeling approach, commonly used as a
means of compliance with section 505, because "[t]he whole point of a
publicized § 504 would be to advise parents that indecent material may be
shown and to afford them an opportunity to block it at all times, even...
after 10 p.m. Time channeling does not offer this assistance."5' 8 The
majority concluded by referring to the "[b]asic speech principles" at stake,
declaring that the Government had not "show[n] that § 505 is the least
restrictive means for addressing a real problem... .,,59
B.

The Dissent

As expected, the Playboy dissent had a decidedly different view,
characterizing sections 504 and 505 as complimentary provisions that work
together creating "default rules" that "respect viewer preferences." 60 The
dissent claimed that the two sections worked together to permit viewers to
see what they want, since "[s]ection 504 requires a cable operator to 'fully
scramble' any channel.., if a subscriber asks not to receive it," and
"[s]ection 505 requires a cable operator to 'fully scramble' every adult
channel unless a subscriber asks to receive it."'6' The dissent went on to
portray the sections as "opt-in" and "opt-out" provisions, saying that "a
subscriber wishing to view an adult channel must 'opt in,"' and
62 "[a]
out."'
'opt
must
channel..,
other
any
view
to
not
wishing
subscriber
The dissent admits that the "less restrictive alternative" test presents a
close question, but their view of the sections as "opt-in" and "opt-out"
63
provisions leads to the major point of disagreement. Seen this way,
sections 504 and 505 "work differently in order to achieve very different
' 4 In the dissent's opinion, section 505 works
legislative objectives. '6
similarly to laws restricting access to "adult cabarets or X-rated movies" by
aiding parents who "may be unaware of what [their children] are
watching," parents who "cannot easily supervise television viewing
habits," and parents who "do not know of their § 504 'opt-out' rights. 65
The dissent was unconvinced that better notice requirements on
section 504 would make it an effective alternative, doubting that "calling

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Playboy, 529 U.S. at 825.
Id. at 827.
Id. at 837.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 846.
Playboy, 529 U.S. at 841.
Id. at 842.
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66
additional attention to adult channels through a 'notice' on 'barker'
channelsol] will make more than a small difference[.]" 67 The dissent went on
to apparently call into question the constitutionality of requiring such
notice: "More importantly, why would doing so not interfere.., with the
cable operators' own freedom to decide what to broadcast? ' 68 Asserting
that imposing expansive restrictions on certain material creates no freedom
of speech problems while mandating that cable companies include a
statement of customers' rights in their promotions is somehow an egregious
violation, rings a bit hollow.
Aside from the irony in the dissent posing the aforementioned
question to support their argument, the proposition simply is not supported
by precedent. In Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, the appellant
challenged portions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, requiring it "to dedicate some of [its] channels to
local broadcast television stations."6 9 The Court ruled that forcing a
broadcaster to carry certain material constituted a content-neutral
restriction on speech, subject to intermediate scrutiny. 0 The Court found
that guaranteeing that local video providers retain a voice relative to the
more powerful cable companies was an "important" governmental
interest,7 ' and that the "provisions [did] not burden substantially more
speech than necessary to further those interests. 72 The dissent itself
maintains that protection of children is not only an "important," but a
"compelling" government interest. 73 Thus, in claiming that requiring notice
of "opt-out" provisions runs into constitutional trouble, the dissent in
essence argues that requiring a notice on a "barker" channel is a more
substantial burden on speech than actually requiring that the cable company
carry additional channels. Such a proposition simply is not logical.
The dissent curiously, and perhaps intentionally, never addresses one
of the majority's main contentions-that broadcast media and cable
television should not be treated analogously. When viewed as a similar
scenario to that of an indecent radio broadcast, the case fits much more
neatly into the precedent set by cases such as Pacifca.74 Indeed, the dissent

66. "Barker" channels are "preview channels of programming coming up on Pay-PerView." Playboy Entm't Group, 30 F.Supp 2d at 719.
67. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 844.

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 844-45.
Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
Id. at 185.
Id. at 190.
Id. at 185.

73. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 843 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
74. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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cites this as a major source of dispute, writing "[i]t is difficult to reconcile
[the Playboy] decision with our foundational cases that have upheld similar
laws, such as... Pacifica.' '75 If one accepts the majority's claim that
broadcast media and cable television pose dissimilar problems, however,
the relevance of Pacifica is fundamentally different. This is one of, if not
the major rift between the majority and dissent.
The dissent takes a stronger position on the value of protecting
children from signal bleed. While the majority questions the extent of
"children transfixed by even flickering pornographic television images," 76
the dissent takes offense to the notion that it might not be a problem, stating
that they "could not disagree more when the majority implies that the
Government's independent interest in offering such protectionpreventing, say, an 8-year-old child from watching virulent pornography
without parental consent-might not be 'compelling.' ' 77 The fact that one
side characterizes signal bleed as merely "flickering images," and the other
refers to it as "virulent pornography" evidences a major difference in
opinion.
Another difference lies in the two sides' treatment of burdens on
speech vis-ai-vis bans on speech. The majority believes there to be little if
any difference, claiming that "[t]he distinction between laws burdening and
laws banning speech is but a matter of degree. The Government's contentbased burdens must satisfy the same rigorous scrutiny as its content-based
bans., 78 The dissent takes an opposite stance, opining that laws making
speech less profitable are not equal in weight to those making speech
illegal, stating that "[t]he difference-between imposing a burden and
enacting a ban-can matter even when strict First Amendment rules are at
issue. ' 79 The dissent relies on this logic throughout their opinion to support
their contention that the statute is "narrowly drawn." The two opinions
obviously disagree on the importance of the difference between burdens
and bans.
C.

Applications of "Least Restrictive" Analysis

The opinions clearly apply the "less restrictive alternative" test to
reach different results, but this is hardly surprising, as it is one of the most
malleable judicial tools at the Court's disposal. Justice Blackmun wrote in
1979 that a "judge would be unimaginative indeed if he could not come up
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Playboy, 529 U.S. at 846.
Id. at 821.
Id. at 843.
Id. at 812.
Id. at 838.
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with something a little less 'drastic' or a little less 'restrictive' in almost
any situation, and thereby enable himself to vote to strike legislation
down."'80 Some might question whether the test carries any meaning, or if it
is simply a device judges use to serve personal agendas. It is helpful to
compare Playboy to other cases in which the Court applied a "least
restrictive" analysis, while keeping in mind the Court's division on topics
such as broadcast media versus cable television and burdens versus bans.
In Sable Communications v. FCC, the Court affirmed the lower
court's decision invalidating a ban on indecent commercial telephone
messages.8 ' Sable's service, commonly known as "dial-a-porn," allowed
users to listen to pre-recorded sexually explicit messages via a toll
82
telephone call. This case obviously turned on the fact that outright bans
are considered to be particularly suspect. The Court relied on this principle
in distinguishing Pacifica, saying "Pacifica is readily distinguishable from
these cases, most obviously because it did not involve a total ban on
broadcasting indecent material." 3 The Court recognized that a compelling
interest existed in "protecting the physical and psychological well-being of
minors," but found that "the statute's denial of adult access to telephone
messages which are indecent but not obscene far exceeds that which is
necessary to limit the access of minors to such messages .... .84 Thus, less
restrictive alternatives inevitably existed, and the ban could not survive.
In another case regarding the blocking of sexually explicit cable
programming, Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium
v. FCC, the Court refused to allow a provision requiring "'patently
offensive' sex-related material appearing on leased channels" to be
segregated and blocked. 85 Specifically, the provision "require[d] cable
system operators to place 'patently offensive' leased channel programming
on a separate channel; to block that channel; to unblock the channel within
30 days of a subscriber's written request for access; and to reblock the
channel within 30 days of a subscriber's request for reblocking.'8' 6 The
Court commented on the restrictive effects the requirements would impose:
These requirements have obvious restrictive effects. The several up-to30-day delays, along with single channel segregation, mean that a
subscriber cannot decide to watch a single program without
80. Ill.
Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 188 (1979)
(Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
81. Sable Comm., 492 U.S. at 117.
82. Id. at 117-18.
83. Id. at 127.
84. Id. at 126, 131.
85. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727,753 (1996).

86. Id. at 753-54.
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considerable advance planning and without letting the "patently
offensive" channel in its entirety invade his household for days,
perhaps weeks, at a time. These restrictions will permit programmers
from broadcasting to viewers who select programs day by day (or,
through "surfing," minute by minute); to viewers who would like
occasionally to watch a few, but not many, of the programs on the
"patently offensive" channel; and to viewers who simply tend to judge
a program's value through channel reputation, i.e., by the company it
keeps.
As in Sable, the Government cited protection of the "physical and
psychological well-being of minors" as the compelling interest it sought to
protect.8 The Government additionally questioned whether indecent
material on television commanded the "strictest First Amendment 'standard
of review."'8 9 The Court found the argument inconsequential, saying that
"once one examines this governmental restriction, it becomes apparent that,
not only is it not a 'least restrictive alternative' and is not 'narrowly
tailored' to meet its legitimate
objective, it also seems considerably 'more
90
extensive than necessary."'
The Denver Court then specifically referred to sections 504 and 505
as less restrictive alternatives, while being careful to note that it was not
determining whether those sections were in fact lawful. 9' It is worth
mentioning that, in writing for the Denver majority, Justice Breyer stated
that sections 504 and 505 both serve the same interest-protecting children
from "patently offensive" material; 92 yet writing for the dissent in Playboy,
Justice Breyer says "[s]ection 504... and § 505 ... work differently in
order to achieve very different legislative objectives."93 This apparent
inconsistency illustrates another shortcoming of strict First Amendment
scrutiny. By defining the relevant "compelling interest" narrowly,
alternative methods rarely seem to serve the same interest, and thus fail to
operate as legitimate alternatives; however, by defining the "compelling
interest" in broader terms, one can easily conceive of numerous alternatives
that would serve the interest in less restrictive ways.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 754.
Id.
Id. at 755.
Id.
Denver, 518 U.S. at 756.
Id.
Playboy, 529 U.S. at 841 (emphasis added).
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Significance of the Case
Many observers will find the relevance of Playboy not immediately
perceptible. The apparent abandoning of long-held precedent, the use of an
ambiguous standard, and the existence of a spirited dissent all coalesce to
produce a decision that is not easily digested. Upon further scrutiny,
however, several key points emerge as the most significant.

D.

1.

What's Not Significant

While an endless list of cases applying "least restrictive" analysis to
different ends could be compiled, the cases described in the preceding
section at least begin to illustrate the point that the test is malleable. This
fact is relevant to the Playboy decision because it shows, to some degree,
how little can be assumed on the basis of the Playboy holding. The
majority and dissent disagree on basic issues that appear to remain
unresolved such as whether heavy financial burdens on speech should be
treated the same way as outright bans on speech, and whether exposure to
scrambled blips of indecent material is harmful to a child's well-being. The
"least restrictive alternative" test allows jurists to frame issues so as to
reach divergent results; therefore, until agreement exists on more pertinent
questions like those above, it is difficult to predict what precedents Playboy
will represent. This point is especially relevant when one considers that it is
generally speculated that several Justices will retire in the near future.
Without a more stable basis for the issues mentioned above, they will
remain unresolved.
2.

The Broadcast Media/Cable Television Distinction

Despite the uncertainty mentioned above, Playboy still has great
precedential potential. If one assumes that by failing to dispute the
majority's "cable television/broadcast media" distinction, the dissent
concedes that a basic difference exists, the holding stands to have
considerable impact. Given that the dissent wrote at length about other
portions of the majority's opinion with which it disagreed, it is hard to
believe that the dissent simply failed to address a point that was central to
the majority's opinion. Rather, it seems more likely that the dissent
grudgingly agreed with the distinction but was better able to support its
position by avoiding the issue. Given this apparent agreement, it is likely
that the single most important consequence of Playboy will be
distinguishing cable television from broadcast media. The effect of this
distinction is likely to be substantial, since it means that, in most situations,
the holding of the landmark telecommunications regulation case Pacifica,
will not apply.
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The Pacifica Court mentioned two specific characteristics of
broadcast media that justified restrictions on indecent broadcasts: (1) "the
broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives
of all Americans; ' 94 and, (2) "broadcasting is uniquely accessible to
children ....
Cable television is similarly "pervasive" and "accessible,"
and the material in question was also deemed "indecent;" in fact, the
Denver Court quoted the same language from Pacifica, demonstrating the
basis for regulating cable television broadcasts. 96 The Playboy Court,
however, chose not to extend the Pacifica reasoning. It chose instead to
recognize the important differences between broadcasts that could be
tailored to a particular recipient and those that are received uniformly.
Without specifically signaling a move toward liberalizing cable
regulation, this distinction certainly removes a significant barrier. Given
that the Supreme Court had previously suggested in Denver that the
Pacifica logic did apply to cable television broadcasts, 97 the Playboy
distinction is not merely the disposition of a fresh issue; it is the revocation
of earlier reasoning now believed to be inaccurate. The significance of this
distinction should not be underestimated. In Playboy, Justice Stevens
referred to it as a "key" point upon which the case turned.98 Undoubtedly,
the distinction could constitute the turning point in future cases as well.
3.

Signal Bleed-Significantly Insignificant

Perhaps it is appropriate that the case's major impact relates only
marginally to the issue of signal bleed. Signal bleed, while now an issue of
Supreme Court proportions, likely will soon be reduced to a non-issue
through technological innovation. The Court writes in Playboy that "digital
systems are projected to become the technology of choice, which would
eliminate the signal bleed problem." 99 Additionally, the Denver Court
mentioned that "manufacturers, in the future, will have to make televisions
with a so-called 'V-chip'-a device that will be able automatically to
identify and block sexually explicit or violent programs. ' ° Thus, it seems
that a holding clearly deciding whether or not signal bleed was a true
94. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
95. Id. at 749.
96. Denver, 518 U.S. at 745 ("Cable television systems, including access channels,

'have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans.' ... 'Patently

offensive' material from these stations can 'confron[t] the citizen' in the 'privacy of the

home'....").
97. Id.
98. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 815.
99. Id. at 808.
100. Denver, 518 U.S. at 756.
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danger would be useful only for a very short time.
V. CONCLUSION
The distinction between broadcast media and cable television is by far
the most far-reaching result of Playboy. The Supreme Court could have
found that because cable television possesses similarly invasive
characteristics to those of broadcast media, Pacifica controls and section
505 should accordingly be upheld; however, such was not the Court's
holding. Instead the Court put forth the idea that there is a key difference
between a medium capable of being blocked on a household-by-household
basis, and one that is broadcast uniformly to all recipients. As both types of
media will undoubtedly be the subjects of future litigation, this distinction
will be central to addressing restrictions placed upon them.
Playboy illustrates that at least five Justices hold the opinion that
outright bans on speech demand a higher burden, and that, accordingly,
burdens on speech should receive a level of scrutiny similar to that of bans.
If this attitude wins out, additional statutes will be invalidated that serve
compelling governmental interests while placing no more than a financial
burden on speech. Though there is no disagreement that protecting children
from harmful material is a compelling interest, the Court could not
decisively say that exposure to signal bleed was actually harmful to
children. As stated above, however, signal bleed is soon to be a problem of
the past.
In writing telecommunications legislation, Congress must recognize
that a permissible restriction on a broadcast medium such as commercial
radio may not be allowed if imposed upon cable television. Additionally, it
must be cognizant of the fact that statutes imposing burdens, rather than
bans, are still subject to extremely high scrutiny. Cable providers need to
make sure that when customers have rights, such as the option to have
certain material omitted from their package, they are aware of those rights.
Playboy and similar companies who provide adult entertainment should be
cautiously optimistic. The broadcast media/cable television distinction is a
victory, but not necessarily a landslide. Support can still be gained or lost,
and a narrow reading of Playboy may only apply the holding to signal
bleed, a soon-to-be-moot issue. Due to the many unresolved issues, any
party having an interest in this case's outcome cannot with great certainty
predict what will happen when similar cases arise in the future. Thus, as the
saying goes, don't touch that dial!
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